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Timeline of the False intel Iraq

The sources and promotion of the Niger uranium forgeries, forged documents claiming Saddam Hussein was trying to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger.
(This fact, if true, meaning he was trying to make nuclear weapons of mass destruction)

Name of Reports Source of information Summary points: But for a full picture you should read the source material, comments pro & con, and explore more.

October 18, 2001 (One month after 9/11)

Central intel,intelligence Agency (CIA) 1st Report,
SEIB: Senior Executive intel,intelligence Brief
"Iraq: Nuclear Related Procurement Efforts"

The CIA says it got this information from SISMI, the Italian intel,intelligence agency.
Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (Military intel,intelligence and Security Service)

Mentioned as part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Report, (link below. )

First mentions of the fact that a foreign government service, says that Niger planned to sell several tons of uranium to Iraq.

This is the first public release of the info coming from the forged documents about Saddam, yellowcake uranium, nuke WMD's.


Copies of the forged documents that led nations to war and caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands.
Additional material also was also used; more material was later fabricated. The initial forged documents may later have been changed.
The alleged telex to the Vatican points to an even wider plot by Saddam to get enriched, yellowcake uranium

From best source of original documents found on the web for False intel Iraq, here.

Documents were all determined to be crude forgeries - which included names and titles that did not match the individuals who held office at the time. With a knowledge of high-school French and Google this could have been determined in less than an hour or two., as it was by the IAEA

December 20, 2001

The first piece of Judith Miller's yellow journalism appears in the New York Times

Report: Iraq working on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

In an email, story, Miller says Ahmad Chalabi "provided most of the front page exclusives on WMD to our paper." Chalabi was supported by the CIA and the White House was was suppose to be the man to replace Saddam.

The defector quoted in this NYT article comes from Chalabi's group.

Over realiance of getting intel from defectors was one of the criticisms of the Senate intel,intelligence Report. The fact that they all were giving false information and supported by the CIA was not questioned. Any defectors or inside spies who said there were no WMD were ignored.

Iraqi defector quoted saying he personally worked on renovations of secret facilities for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. behind palaces, beneath hospitals, throughout the country.

February 5, 2002

2nd CIA report: Same info reported, based on the documents above, that Saddam Hussein is seeking to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger.

And thus plans to build nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

February 12, 2002

Defense intel,intelligence Agency (DIA)

Mentioned as part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Report, link below.


Goes along with CIA claims) saying: "Iraq probably is searching abroad for natural uranium to assist in its nuclear weapons program."

February, 2002

Meeting of big officials at U.S. Embassy in Niger.

Not reported till June 24th

Former ambassador Joseph Wilson also sent to Niger by CIA to check out these yellowcake claims.

The deputy commander of U.S. Armed Forces Europe, Marine General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., went to Niger and met with the country's president, Tandja Mamadou. He concluded that, given the controls on Niger's uranium supply, there was little chance any of it could have been diverted to Iraq. His report was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. [[Richard Myers]

Wilson's report saying the yellowcake claims are false doesn't become much more than a footnote somewhere. The explanation for this being: Since Wilson reinforced the idea that the yellowcake claims were not true; and the CIA wasn't shouting up and down and making big noise about the yellowcake claims being true, then there wasn't much to add. (!?)

Wilson's trip didn't become big news till after the war started and he revealed being sent on this trip and his report to the CIA about it.

Considering this -- none of it known to the general public but being told to the CIA and the DIA by people they sent their themselves to check this yellowcake claim out -- why did the intel,intelligence reports from the CIA and DIA keep talking about the false claim they had checked out and found no proof to?

This was the biggest criticism of Sec. of State, former general Colin Powell. Doubts about facts being true are called "burn notices," and he complained that he wasn't told about the many 'burn notices,' before his U.N. speech.

March, 2002

U.S. State Department Bureau of intel,intelligence and Research (INR) report:
"Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq is Unlikely."

Mentioned as part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Report, link below.

The State Department is the only intel,intelligence agency on public record as doubting this false intel.

As a result it appears they were then "out of the loop,' in the promoting of this false information by the other agencies and a special new 'task force,' set up in Vice-President Dick Cheney's office:


May 10, 2002

NESA (CIA’s Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis) in the Directorate of intel,intelligence (DI) prepared a Principals Committee briefing book updating the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs

Mentioned as part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Report, link below

The document noted that a "foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from Niger."

June 24, 2002

Cable from the US Embassy in Niger - report of a meeting with Niger leading officials

Mentioned as part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Report, link below.

Although this cable says nobody at the meeting knew or believed in any yellowcake deal for Saddam the follow up intel,intelligence reports by CIA and other point out that the officials all knew their comments would get back to D.C. intel,intelligence Community. There is also a reference to a minor Commerce Minister mentioning meeting a minor Iraqi commerce minister and there was a mention of "expanding commerce."

In contrast to trading uranium with Iraq, Niger was signing deals with the major and most valid uranium watch dog group: IAEA.

Cable says Niger had signed a comprehensive agreement with IAEA to help ensure Niger's uranium was used only for "peaceful purposes."

July 22, 2002

Department of Energy Memo (aka "intel,intelligence product,"),: Daily intel,intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway?

Mentioned as part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Report, link below.

This highlight highlights the intel,intelligence (above) on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal as one of three indicators (all later proved wrong) that Iraq might be reconstituting its nuclear program. Purchase of aluminum tubes was another of the indicators that made it's way into Presidential speeches.


The extensive IC (intel,intelligence Community) appears to start to quote itself. DOE now reinforcing that Iraq might be trying to reconstitute its nuclear program, citing the alleged Niger deal.

September 2002

UK, British intel,intelligence issues a 'White Paper,' aka "The September Dossier."

Some feel that the two nations colluded in these claims like they were working together trying to get the UN to threaten Iraq with a joint resolution at the UN on Feb. 24, 2003. (info)

This is where the British made the false Saddam yellowcake claims from Niger - which Bush references in his infamous '16-words," in the State of the Union, January, 2003.

The Italian intel,intelligence agency, SISMI, had starting doing intensive second dissemination of the Niger uranium forgeries, though a 'rogue agent,' they hire and from the Director of SISMI going straight to the White House.


Sources can not be revealed, though, the JIC said, because the sources have to be protected. Although maybe they're protecting themselves more


In this White Paper (aka, the September Dossier) is says: "There is intel,intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa."


Copy of key page from the British 'White Paper.'
This paper was claimed to come from the British JIC - Joint intel,intelligence Committee - the umbrella group for all of British spy & intel,intelligence services.

This dossier formed the basis of the government’s case to Parliament for invading Iraq. But after the war started two investigations discovered that there was false intel in this White Paper that was not in the first drafts of the JIC; someone had added false intel to the summary, info.


In the report, Prime Minister Tony Blair writes "In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world."

Note: two of the pieces of false intel "inappropriately added," to this White Paper were the claim that Iraq could deploy WMD within 45 minutes and another false claim that it was continuing to produce chemical and biological agents. In a later investigation (the Butler Commission) The British Cabinet Office’s says it has no record of which officials s made these substantial changes to the dossier’s executive summary; although in a separate case of planting false intel, the British government "refused to deny," allegations that John Scarlett, the former head of JIC (the Joint intel,intelligence Committee) tried to also put 10 pieces of false into into the weapons inspection report of the Iraq Survey Group, info.

Note: Another substantial challenge to the info in the White Paper After the war started, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has questioned the veracity of Tony Blair`s justification for invading Iraq In his resignation speech in parliament in March 2003, the week of the invasion, Cook cited
that he did not believe Iraq had any usable WMD as a reason for his
departure from the government.

Around this point in time - a half a year before the invasion - British, Italian and U.S. intel,intelligence becomes the promotion of false intel,intelligence - reasons for war that all proved wrong.

These ideas are now put out into the public by Bush and White House officials.


August 26, 2002

Vice-President Dick Cheney speaks to VFW National Convention,

For this and other quotes from Bush and White House officials about Saddam Hussein having and also building WMD, click here. "Simply stated," Cheney says, "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction

September, 2002

2nd DIA- Defense intel,intelligence Agency intel,intelligence assessment

Mentioned as part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Report, link below.

The word, "vigorously," is specifically questioned and investigated. It makes Saddam's pursuit of yellowcake sound much stronger. Although full of whitewashing the Senate intel,intelligence Committee did decide this use of the word: 'vigorously,' was "inappropriate."


Says "Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake."

September 8, 2002

An extraordinary day of White House lobbying for war, appearing on major Sunday Morning TV Talk Shows making the false claim that Saddam was trying to build nukes.

Saddam trying to build nukes, fear of nuclear terrorism, was now going to show up on every front page.


article about that day


The official, deliberately spy-crafted 'justification,' for these comments was a front page story in the New York Times -- a story the White House Iraq Group had planted there themselves.

But making the excuse that now that this alleged intel,intelligence information has been published it was okay for White House officials to talk about it.

This false intel published in the NYT was manufactured by the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, a special office set up by Wolfowitz that the Senate intel,intelligence Committee and the Dept. of Defense also labeled: "inappropriate."

On “Meet the Press” the Vice-president said, "He [Saddam] is in fact actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.”

On CNN, Sec. of State Condoleezza Rice said "We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.

September 8, 2002

Judith Miller's yellow journalism makes a big splash in the New York Times & TV talk shows.


A good tracking of Judith Miller's yellow journalism and extensive publishing of false information concerning Iraq, here.

Before it's over their will be fearsome characters, like 'Madame Smallpox."

"Iraqi defectors who once worked for the nuclear weapons establishment have told American officials that acquiring nuclear arms is again a top Iraqi priority."

Up to now this false claim about Saddam trying to make nuke weapons was only in secret intel,intelligence reports unknown to the public.

Not only make them, but then give them to groups like al-Qaeda to use .


Now the public relations effort to sell the war was in full swing.

In one week the President, the Vice-President and the Sec. of State put fear of a nuclear attack from Saddam Hussein into the hearts of every American.



September 9 2002

Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley meets with head of SISMI, Italian intel,intelligence

A secret meeting , (outside of normal channels and procedures). This the same info the CIA had gotten from SISMI and made minor notice of almost a year ago. Now this yellowcake claim becomes bigger news, more talked about, winds up in the President's State of the Union speech, January 2003.
Head of Italian intel,intelligence says the yellow cake claims are real.

September 11, 2002

National Security Council inserts the yellow cake claim into the speech Bush scheduled to give the next day at the United Nations.

  President Bush's upcoming address to the United Nations, scheduled for September 12, 2002. The CIA removed the reference 24 hours before the address was given.

September 11, 2002

First removal of yellowcake claim from a Bush speech, removed by CIA

  The CIA removed the reference 24 hours before the address was given.

September 11, 2002

National Security Council (NSC asks CIA for clear statement on this false intel.

Part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Report, link below. Read "CIA clear statement," below.

September 12, 2002

President Bush speaks to the United Nations (one year and one day after 9/11)

Text of Bush 'Iraq speech,' to the U.N.


Many claims that proved to not be true; but no mention of the yellowcake claim

Says Saddam giving shelter to al-Qaeda and anti-Israel terror organization, praised the 9/11 attack, is rebuilding facilities for biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction and has the ability to build nuclear weapons, has try to buy aluminum tubes used for nuke weapons production, not cooperating with weapons inspectors, violating the restrictions on it's oil sales, etc.

Central intel,intelligence Agency (CIA) "clear statement" which adds another piece of False intel Iraq, the claim about aluminum tube purchased by Iraq as being part of a Saddam Hussein program to develop nuclear weapons, (but later info shows these tubes were for rockets, not suitable for nuclear power production. )

Claims about yellowcake still there but no mention of Niger or any specifics. And talks about Saddam being "caught," trying to buy yellowcake (!?)

CIA 'clear statement" to National Security Council

September 15, 2002
(close to one year after initial CIA report about the yellowcake claims)

"Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

And we know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient in this process.

The regime was caught trying to purchase up to 500 metric tons of this material. It takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon."

i.e. Saddam Hussein purchased enough uranium for 50 nuclear bombs.

September 17, 2002

New National Security Strategy document is released.

For the first time in U.S. history advocates the value and need for pre-emptive war, first strikes, military pre-eminence, and other aggressive military and economic policies.

September 19, 2002

Iraq War Resolution introduced to Congress

Officially titled: Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 The resolution authorized President Bush to use the Armed Forces of the United States "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate...regarding Iraq."

Somewhere around this time, or maybe even before Sept. 8, 2002, French intel,intelligence was asked about these claims of Saddam trying to buy yellowcake uranium and they said the documents were forged.

{Note: Niger was a former French colony)

Mentioned as part of U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee Reports (link below.) French intel,intelligence say these claims false.

October, 4 2002 to October, 7, 2002

There are many reports about disagreements in putting this yellowcake uranium claim into the next speech to be given by President Bush, in Cincinnati October, 2002...the speech with the ominous references to a 'mushroom cloud."

The National Security Council wrote the speech and it included the claim about Saddam trying to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger, info.

The reference to yellowcake was removed.

October 8, 2002, the CIA proposed a more vague, general reference to the False intel. info.

The next mention of this claim of Saddam seeking to buy yellowcake appears in the the State of the Union speech, the infamous 16_words, (the Smoking-gun. )

Closer scrutiny of this moment might reveal significant information about who was making , promoting and most using False intel Iraq.

Reporter Bob Woodward interviewed former Deputy Secretary of State, neocon, Richard Armitage, who said this, implying that CIA Director George Tenet removed this 16_words at that time.


October, 7, 2002

Bush's Cincinnati speech about Saddam seeking nuke WMDs , but not mention of Niger yellowcake.

Full text of Cincinnati speech
The speech talks of satellite info that claimed to prove Saddam was trying to rebuild his biological weapons program but also talked of fear of him making a nuclear bomb and of giving nuclear bombs to terrorist, etc.

October, 2002

The controversial NIE - National intel,intelligence Estimate of Oct. 2002.

There is an original version and an edited, rewritten White House version.

And disputes about who was controlling the content.

Download pdf from here,Document #15

One problem appears to be that Congress asked for a summary of this NIE and they were given a summary document that was actually written before the NIE itself, link and some evidence suggest it was written 'in collusion,' with the British White Paper released a month earlier (mentioned above), and, most significantly, complaints of White House pressure to make the intel,intelligence sound and be the way they wanted; not the way it was.

For a long, long, long time there wasn't any hard proof or testimony about this. Reporter Bob Woodward hinted at this the most, hinted there were arguments between the CIA, NSA and White House about what went into President's speeches and into important intel,intelligence summaries like this.

Initial British and U.S. Senate (Republican controlled) investigations whitewashed all this. But later...

In December, 2008, testimony by some of those involved in front of the U.S. House Oversight Committee indicated their were arguments about using the yellowcake claim and other alleged intel,intelligence, here.

The 'Yellowcake from Niger Claim," is here, .
Quote: "A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of ``pure uranium'' (probably yellowcake) to Iraq"

it added there were also reports that Saddam was trying to also get uranium ore from Somalia and maybe also the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It's told to Congress, with "High Confidence."

  • Iraq is continuing and in some areas expanding it's chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.
  • We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.
  • Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.
  • Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

Photocopy of declassified version of the National intel,intelligence Estimate, October 2002

Investigation of these claims by the U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee in 2004 and 2008
said all the major claims of Saddam having biological, chemical or nuclear weapons programs
were based on poor intel,intelligence, exaggerated or non-existent data or poor analysis.

October, 11 2002

Iraq War Resolution passes Congress

Signed into law by Bush, October 16, 2002

Gives Bush authority to enforce UN Resolutions; urges diplomacy first, but know and reported by CNN, etc. as giving Bush authority to invade Iraq, CNN

[Note: The UN doesn't approve of this; it's not it's procedure for one single nation state to enforce UN resolutions]

Provisions of Iraq War Resolution

November 2002

Iraq agrees to renewed weapons inspections by two UN agencies. Over 1,000 weapons inspectors go to Iraq.for a renewed

As a result of the U.S. and British campaign making false accusation about Iraq trying to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction programs (WMD programs which it had built up during it's 8-year long war with Iran) -- , and after prolonged negotiations between the United States, Britain, France, Russia and other U.N. Security Council members, the United Nations declared that Iraq would have to accept even more intrusive inspections than under the previous inspection regime - to be carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - or face "serious consequences."
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441

December 7, 2002

Iraq submits extensive documentation indicating it has no WMDs.

"We have no WMDs", says Saddam.
December 19, 2002

State Department Cites Gaps - Material Omissions in Iraq's documentation about having no WMDs, here.

In a Department of State Fact Sheet titled: Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council

At a December 19 press conference, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that U.S. experts found the Iraqi declaration "to be anything but currently accurate, full, or complete." He also charged that the declaration "totally fails to meet the resolution's requirements." The same day the State Department issued a fact sheet providing several examples of omissions from the declaration.

December 2002

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction published

Download pdf from here, Document #19
"We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.
"because deterrence may not succeed ... U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through pre-emptive measures."

January 29, 2003

President George W. Bush's State of the Union Address, - the infamous 16_words quoted in our Intro.

transcript of this State of the Union Address, click here.


“The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

February, 2003

Annual Wehrkunde meeting in Munich

Deputy Sec. of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and U.S. Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman attend security conference The French & Germans are told they "must make a choice.” The U.S. is going to war: "Iraq is in our sights."

February 14 , 2003

Sec. of State Colin Powell give presentation to the United Nations, claiming all the major points of False intel Iraq.

One staff member describes it as the 'lowest point in his life," story. As presented in on our Intro page, Sec. of State Powell later felt he was not given honest information and said he felt deceived.

February 20 , 2003

Dr Hans Blix, United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector phones PM Tony Blair.
"I said to Mr Blair that we needed evidence and we did not have evidence...And he said "no, no" we are convinced, all the intel,intelligence services are sure, even the Egyptian intel,intelligence service tells us so"


February 24 , 2003

"Draft Resolution by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Spain,presented to the U.N. Security Council.

copy of Draft Resolution


The resolution says Iraq has submitted "false statements" and "failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it by resolution 1441," through which the council provided Iraq a final chance to disarm.

Resolution says the United Kingdom, the United States, and Spain are " Determined to secure full compliance" by Iraq"

March 7, 2003

Transcript of IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed El Baradei's presentation to the U.N. Security Council, two weeks prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq; after State of Union, Jan. 2003

Says yellowcake uranium documents phony, no proof of WMD's in Iraq.

March 17 , 2003

UK, US and Spain won't seek vote on draft resolution and said they reserved the right to take their own steps to secure that country's disarmament.

UN News Center article
Invasion of Iraq begins two days later.

March 20 , 2003

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was officially dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by the U.S. military.

It is also know as the Iraq War, the Second Gulf War or the Occupation of Iraq

general background info

Although there were references to other resolutions that Saddam was accused of violating, Iraq's "failure to comply with its disarmament obligations" was the prime reason claiming to justify war, failing to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441

The major reasons given to the UN by the governments of the U.S., U. K, and Spain is considered the claim that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a serious and imminent threat

Note: Coalition forces led by the United States invaded Iraq without UN approval.

The UN does not and can not authorize individual nations to take military action on their own.


The USA sent the UN Security Council a letter one day after the invasion started, March 20, 2003 and this letter said the U.S. had “commenced in Iraq. These operations are necessary,” continued the letter, “in view of Iraq’s continued material breaches of its disarmament obligation sunder relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1441, info.

The U.S. March 20, 2003 letter claimed it's actions were "authorized under existing Council resolutions, including its resolutions 678 and 687 .

It's doubtful if this U.S. claim is valid.


June 6 , 2003

Former ambassador Joseph Wilson - who was sent by the CIA to Africa -- write his critical Op-Ed in the NYT: "What I Didn't Find in Africa."

Pre-war Wilson goes public about his report to the CIA, where he challenge the false intel yellowcake from Niger claims,here.
Wilson was sent by to investigate this by the CIA. Found no truth to forged documents

July 21 , 2003

The contentious October 2002 NIE is declassified and parts read into the Congressional Record.

Later, the U.S. Senate intel,intelligence Committee that investigates this October 2002 NIE is not happy, complaining it is excessively redacted, mainly just whit ed-out pages.

The suspicious that develops it there were two versions of the the one the White House actually got and the version that was declassified and distributed to members of Congress.

The suspicion is the White House rewrote this NIE using exaggerated False intel Iraq.

more info
Although there have been previous Congressional critics this declassification of the October NIE starts a tide of questions from Congress.

September 27, 2003

The Harmon-Gross Letter,

This comes from ranking members of the House intel,intelligence Committee and cast judgments on the quality and validity of the info used to justify the war.


Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla.) and Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.), write to the president and say the intel,intelligence now seems "circumstantial and fragmentary," and contained "too many uncertainties

The next and last claim about Saddam Hussein trying to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger that concerns this investigation appears in Iraq. (see below)    

December 13, 2003

Memo claiming to be found in Iraq, that would confirm that Saddam was trying to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger
(and had links to al-Qaeda 9/11 hijack leader)

“We in Iraq are building nuke WMD’s
(and trained 9/11 terrorist leader, Mohammed Atta) Memo"


It's claimed Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Takriti , head of Iraqi intel,intelligence Services under Saddam wrote this memo dated July 2001 to Saddam Hussein.

Others claim the CIA forged this memo (which would be the 2nd set of forged document about this)